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MULTI-STATE DEFAMATION AND THE LONG-ARM
INTRODUCTION

Under the present Illinois "long-arm" statute,' jurisdiction
in a multi-state defamation case over a non-resident defendant
who is not doing business within the state is based upon the
commission of a tortious act within the state.2 When the assertion of such in personam jurisdiction is challenged the court faces
an extremely complex question: Whether the defendant has had
sufficient contact with the state of Illinois for submission jurisdiction to be invoked consonant with the due process requirements
of InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington.3 The purpose of this
comment is to examine the theories and considerations relevant in
deciding this jurisdictional question. Although fundamentally
concerned with defamation and the "long-arm," the analysis
herein is equally applicable to the tort of invasion of privacy.
IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION

The origin of in personam jurisdiction is coincident with the
development of the organized body politic. Implicit in the idea
of an organized society was the theory that the citizens and residents of such a body were subject to the power and authority of
the society's machinery for adjudicating controversies which
arose between its citizens. In an age when the organized state
was relatively simple and the people rather stationary, this simple concept of jurisdiction over persons owing allegiance to the
sovereign and those within the sovereign's physical boundaries
worked reasonably well. The rationale of the "allegiance" theory
of jurisdiction was that the citizens owed certain obligations to
the sovereign for benefits they received.
The United States' federal system of dual sovereignty presented conflict of laws problems which necessitated an alteration
of the "allegiance" theory. 5 The change took the form of a doc1 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§16-17 (1967).
2 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §17(1) (b)
(1967).
3 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4 The historical development of in personam jurisdiction has been thoroughly discussed by numerous authors. The sole purpose of reviewing here
the sequential development of in personam jurisdiction is to examine the
theories upon which the various foundations of such jurisdiction were based;
and, the extent to which those theories are, or are not, suited to the special

jurisdictional problems of interstate, or multi-state, defamation. For a
thorough discussion of the history of personal jurisdiction see generally T.
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5 It should be noted, however, that an analogous problem existed in
England in the area of venue as it related to the counties and the diverse allegiances of the subjects to the various lesser lords of the kingdom. See
Johnston, The Fallacy of Physical Power, 1 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC.
37, 44-49 (1967).
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trine often referred to as the "physical power" doctrine. This
doctrine became an established concept of jurisdiction following the decision in Pennoyer v. Neff .6 Actually, the "physical
power" doctrine was a consequence of a strict interpretation of
the concept of state sovereignty and required that the state
actually have physical control over the person of the defendant,7
i.e., one had to be physically within the state's boundaries to be
8
validly served with process.
A corollary to the "physical power" doctrine was the "physical presence" theory." The test employed to determine whether
one was physically present in a state varied with the type of defendant, whether a corporation " or an individual, and the nature
of the act committed by the defendant.1 Corporations which engaged in business within a state other than their state of incorporation were frequently required to register and expressly
consent to be sued there. 12 This "express consent" theory permitted the court to have jurisdiction over a defendant as to any
cause of action's regardless of where the operative facts arose,
and, as a condition precedent to doing business within a state,
the corporation was required to appoint an agent within the
state upon whom process could be served. The idea of consenting
to be sued was subsequently expanded to include implied consent
4
as well as express consent.
The "implied consent" theory rested on the state's right to
regulate certain other kinds of activity 15 occurring within its
boundaries or which affected its citizens.-o Such activities were
usually those whereby the rights of citizens and residents of a
state were affected on a large scale.
States have legitimately
maintained a special regulatory interest in such activities upon
the basis that such an interest is implicit in the right and duty of
a sovereign state to protect the lives and property of those within
its boundaries.8
6 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
7 J. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWs 21-23 (8th ed. 1883).
8 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877).
9 Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1897).
10 Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930).
"I See generally Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction; The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L. J. 289 (1956).
12 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404 (1855).
1
Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148 (S.D.
N.Y. 1915).
'1 Johnston, The Fallacy of Phy8ical Power, 1 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. &

Poc. 37, 49-51 (1967).

15See note 19 infra.
16 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
17 Id. at 252-53.
18 Generally, the right of a sovereign to make laws, both substantive
and procedural, is directly related to its self interest. This is an old and
well recognized principle. Story, citing Boulenois, stated:
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The need of a state to protect its residents from another potential source of injury came with the advent of the automobile
and the attendant hazards associated with its use. As a result,
states enacted non-resident motorist statutes1 9 which generally
provided for service by mail and substitute service upon a designated state official. 20 The intended protection was primarily
from potential tortious injury; whereas, the reason for requiring
corporations to register was to protect residents from contractual
as well as tortious injury.2 1 Corporations that failed to register
could still be physically present in a state if they were conducting
a sufficient amount of business in that state. The test employed
to determine whether or not a corporation was physically present
was that of "doing business." This test was generally quantitative notwithstanding the fact that the volume of business that
one needed to be doing in a state to be considered physically
22
present varied from state to state.

The landmark case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington23 was in many ways the final step in carrying the concept
of in personam jurisdiction to its present definition.2 4 The pre[Elvery nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction
within its own territory.
(1) He or those who have the sovereign authority, have the sole
right to make laws; and these laws ought to be executed in all places
within the sovereignty where they are known, in the prescribed manner.
(2) The sovereign has power and authority over his subjects and over
the property which they possess within his dominions. (3) the sovereign has also authority to regulate the forms and solemnities of contracts which his subjects make within the territories under his dominions, and to prescribe the rules for the administration of justice.
(4) The sovereign has also a right to make laws to govern foreigners
in many cases; for example, in relation to property which they possess
within the reach of his sovereignty; in relation to the formalities of
contracts which they make within his territories, and in relation to
judiciary proceedings, if they institute suits before his tribunals. (5)
The sovereign may in like manner make laws for foreigners who even
pass through his territories; but these laws are either permanent, or
they are made only for certain occurrences.
J. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws 21-22 (8th ed. 1883).
19 Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916).
20 Hess v. Pawloski, 275 U.S. 352 (1927).
21 See note 18 supra.
22 Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
28 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
24 In InternationalShoe, a Delaware corporation, which only employed
salesmen to solicit orders in the state of Washington and was not otherwise
doing business in that state, was held to be subject to substitute service of
process in Washington because the obligation sued upon arose out of the
corporation's Washington activities. The Court stated, "[it is evident that
these operations establish sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the
forum to make it reasonable and just . . . to permit the state to enforce the
obligations . . . incurred there." Id. at 320. On the basis of such contacts
with Washington the Court found that the non-resident defendant company
was conducting continuous and systematic business within the forum state.
That finding was sufficient under the prevailing "doing business" theory to
establish in personam jurisdiction over the defendant. The Court, however,
took the occasion to enunciate the theory of "minimum contacts." And, while
the utterance was merely judicial dictum, its pervasive effect was, nonetheless, undiminished.
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vious theories of "allegiance," "physical power" and "consent"
were inadequate in light of the vast changes that had occurred
in transportation and communications. The doctrine of "minimum contacts" declared in InternationalShoe enlarged the base
of state jurisdiction and provided a reasonably workable foundation for jurisdiction over non-residents. The only limitations on
the assertion of jurisdiction based upon "minimum contacts"
were the vague concepts of "due process," "fair play" and "sub2
stantial justice. 5
whether,
The primary issue in InternationalShoe was "...
within the limitations of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment . ..a Delaware corporation, [had] by its activities
in the State of Washington rendered itself amenable to proceedings in the courts of that State . ... "2 The Court responded
affirmatively to that issue on the basis of the theory of "minimum contacts.1 27 The rationale behind the holding was that
single acts may be sufficient to give the state in personam jurisdiction "because of their nature. and quality and the circumstances of their commission.12 8 "[T]he quality and nature
of the activity" in relation to orderly judicial administration was
the basic consideration in determining whether or not due process
requirements were met.29 The extension of International Shoe
was, to a large degree, prompted by the need of the state to
protect its residents from injury inflicted by one outside of the
physical boundaries of the state. 0 There is no question concerning the authority of a state to do so. The United States Constitution recognizes many areas of state interest and implicitly
leaves such areas to the states to regulate." The right of a state
to protect its legitimate and proper interests is not doubted.
It is the appropriateness of the exercise of that right which is
determinative of whether the state has violated the constitutional
rights of the individual defendant. This is why Mr. Justice Black
25

See note 31 infra.

26 326

U.S. 310, 311 (1945).

27 The court said:

[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the

forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice."
Id. at2 8 316.
Id. at 318.

29 Id. at 319.
30 See note 18 supra.

81 Mr. Justice Black, in a dissenting opinion in InternationalShoe, made
this clear when he expressed concern for first amendment rights:
[Wle should . . . decline the invitation to formulate broad rules as to
the meaning of due process, which here would amount to deciding a constitutional question "in advance of the necessity for its decision." ...
The Court . . . has engaged in an unnecessary discussion in the course

of which it has announced vague Constitutional criteria applied for the
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so strongly argued that to base a state's jurisdictional foundation
upon vague notions of natural justice (such as "fair play" or
"substantial justice"), without regard to the nature of the act
or conduct involved, is to permit the potential abridgement of
the first amendment rights of freedom of speech and of the press.
The possibility of this danger becoming a reality is by no means
remote.32
Illinois responded to the invitation of InternationalShoe in
1955 when it enacted a "long-arm" statute 3 with the intention of
extending, to the limits of due process 34 as defined in Interna-

tional Shoe, the state's jurisdictional authority over non-resident
defendants who had had certain prescribed minimum contacts

with the state. 35 The constitutionality of the Illinois "long-arm"

was first raised in Nelson v. Miller 3 6 where jurisdiction over the
defendant was based upon section 17(1) (b). The defendant

contended that such a jurisdictional base denied him due process
first time to the issue before us. It has thus introduced uncertain elements confusing the simple pattern and tending to curtail the exercise

not justified by the Constitution.
326 3U.S. 310, 322-25 (1945) (emphasis added).
2See Comment, Long-Arm Jurisdiction Over Publishers: To Chill A
Mocking Word, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 342 (1967).
8 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §17 (1967):

(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State,
who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter
enumerated, thereby submits such person, and if an individual his
personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this §tate
as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of such acts:
(a) The transaction of any business within this State;
(b) The commission of a tortious act with this State;
(c) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated
in this State;
(d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located
within this State at the time of contracting.
(2) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this State, as provided in this Section, may
be made by personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside
this State. as provided in this Act, with the same force and effect as
though summons had been personally served within this State.
(3) Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated herein
may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction
over him is based upon this Section.
(4) Nothing herein contained limits or affects the right to serve
any process in any other manner now or hereafter provided by law.
34 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §17 (Smith-Hurd 1969), Historical & Practice
Notes.
35 Section 16 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act permits extra-territorial
service of process upon a defendant who has submitted to the state's jurisdiction by engaging in one of the types of conduct enumerated in section 17.
Section 16 provides, in part:
(1) Personal service of summons may be made upon any party
outside the State. If upon a citizen or resident of this State or upon a
person who has submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State,
it shall have the force and effect of personal service of summons within
this State; otherwise it shall have the effect of service by publication.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §16 (1967).
86 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673
(1957). In Nelson the non-resident
defendant's employee negligently injured the plaintiff while unloading an
appliance in Illinois. Both the tortious act and the injury occurred within
Illinois and the injured plaintiff was an Illinois resident.
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of law which was a violation of the Illinois constitution 3' and of
8
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.3
The court, however, upheld the constitutionality of sections 16
and 17 and cited InternationalShoe to support the acknowledged
change in the foundation of jurisdiction over the non-resident
defendant, stating:
The foundations of jurisdiction include the interest that a State
has in providing redress in its own courts against persons who inflict injuries upon, or otherwise incur obligations to,
those within
39
the ambit of the State's legitimate protective policy.

The question necessarily arises as to who is to be included
within the limits or scope of the "State's legitimate protective
policy." The residents of the state would seem to be included
as is indicated by the analogy drawn in Nelson between a foundation of jurisdiction in the form of a "long-arm" statute and in
the form of a non-resident motorist statute. 40 The rationale of
the Nelson court upon which such jurisdiction could be sustained
" . ..is to be found in the legitimate interest of the State in
providing redress in its courts against persons who, having substantial contacts with the State, incur obligations to those enentitled to the State's protection.' 41 It would, therefore, seem
reasonable to conclude that the state's primary interest is in pro-

tecting its residents from injury by a non-resident who is either
not within, or is no longer within, the state's physical boundaries.42 This is not to suggest that the state has no other le87

ILL. CONST. art. 2, §2.

3811 Ill. 2d 378, 383, 143 N.E.2d 673, 676 (1957).
39 Id. at 384, 143 N.E.2d at 676.
40
The Nelson court quoting Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Olberding v.
Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953), stated: "[A non-resident motorist
statute] is'a fair rule of law as between a resident injured party (for whose
protection these statutes are primarily intended) and a non-resident motorist, and . . . the requirements of due process are . . . met."

Nelson

v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 387, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957) (emphasis added).
In Olberding an action was brought under the Kentucky non-resident motorist statute, which provided that non-resident motorists operating vehicles
on
Kentucky
highways
therebyresulting
make the
Secretary
of State
operation
their agent
in Kenfrom
the vehicle's
of process
in actions
for
service
tucky.

The Court held that the defendant did not impliedly consent to be

sued
in Kentuckyover
merely
he drove
truck on
Kentucky
highways.
express
or imdid nothisrequire
consent,
the because
defendant
But jurisdiction
plied:

The
liability rests on the inroad which the automobile has made social
the
decision of Pennoyer v. Neff, as it has on so many aspects of our on
scene. The potentialities of damage by a motorist . . . are such that
those whom he injures must have opportunities of redress against him

provided only that he is afforded an opportunity to defend himself.
Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953).
41 Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 389, 143 N.E.2d 673, 679 (1957).
Thelis conclusion has substantial weight added to it in view of the
Nelson court's use of a Vermont statute for support. The court stated:
A Vermont statute provides for jurisdiction over any foreign corporation
which "makes a contract with a resident of Vermont to be performed in
whole or in part by either party in Vermont, or... commits a tort in
whole or in part in Vermont against a esident of Vermont."
Id. at 390, 143 N.E.2d at 679 (emphasis added).
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gitimate interests to protect; but the fact is inescapable that the
primary purpose of protecting specified areas of state interest is
to secure from harm those who are within the state's sovereign
authority or control and to provide them with a reasonable
43
forum to redress their legal wrongs.
Nevertheless, the protection of a non-resident from injury
within the state is also a recognized function and interest of the
state.

"[Clertainly . . . the hardship on the defendant [is] no

greater, than if the plaintiff resided in Illinois. But the nature of
the cause of action may be important when the plaintiff is a non4

resident." 4
The'limits of due process have certainly been approached
in cases where the "long-arm" has been stretched to reach nonresidents acting outside the state but causing injury within the
state. In Heliriegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co. 45 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, applying the
Illinois "long-arm" statute, refused to assert jurisdiction over an
Ohio manufacturer whose defectively manufactured product
caused injury within the state of Illinois. The United States
Supreme Court, however, gave impetus to the expansive and
imaginative use of "long-arm" statutes with its decision in
McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co.4 6 For the purposes

of due process, it was held to be sufficient "that the suit was
based on a contract which had substantial connection with that
State."47
Notwithstanding the pronouncement of McGee, the mere
mailing of materials into the state was generally held to be insuf48
ficient to satisfy the qualitative test of minimum contacts.
43 Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L. F. 533.
44 Id. at 543 (emphasis added).
45 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
48 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
The plaintiff in McGee, a California resident,
had obtained and made premium payments on an insurance policy through
the mails with an out of state insurance company which had neither an
agent nor an officer in California. Suit was brought under a California
statute which subjected foreign corporations to suit in California notwithstanding the fact that service of process was not within California but was
only by mail to the corporation's principal place of business. The Court
held that California had a definite interest in providing a forum and the due
process clause was not thereby violated because "[t]he contract was delivered in California, the premiums . . . mailed from there and the insured
was a resident of that State when he died." Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
47
48

Id. at 223.

Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959). In
Mueller suit was brought in Minnesota against a Michigan corporation for
negligent construction of a chair which plaintiff purchased from another in

Minnesota. Service of process was made pursuant to a Minnesota statute
which provided, inter alia, that foreign corporations who commit a tort in
whole or in part in Minnesota against a resident are deemed to be doing busi..
ness in Minnesota and to have appointed the secretary of state as the corporation's agent upon whom process could be served. The effect of such
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Similarly, in Trippe Manufacturing Co. v. Spencer,49 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the
fraudulent use of pictures in a catalog mailed into the state was
not sufficient to constitute an act within the state for the purposes

of "long-arm" jurisdiction.
In Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corp.,59 the same
court that decided Trippe also refused to extend the "long-arm"
in a libel action where the resident plaintiff claimed to have been
injured by defamatory matter published in a newspaper which
was mailed into Illinois subsequent to being circulated elsewhere.
The court said that:
[Tihe 17(1) (b) jurisdictional requirements are met (1) "when
the defendant, personally or through an agent, is the author of
acts or omissions within the State," and (2) "when the complaint
states a cause of action in tort arising from such conduct."'
In the Insull court's view "[t] he Nelson analysis sets forth
the two requirements in conjunctive form. Both must be met
for 17(1) (b) jurisdiction to exist. Failure to meet one is sufficient to dispose of the issue."'' 2 In applying the Nelson analysis
to the facts in Insull, the court held that the "long-arm" was insufficient to subject the defendants to the jurisdiction of Illinois
courts because of Illinois' interpretation of the "multiple comservice was to render the foreign corporation subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the court as to causes of action arising from the tort. The
court held that the

"

. . .

statute assumes to obliterate all conditions prece-

dent heretofore considered essential to the State's jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in a tort action." Id. at 420. Consequently, the defendant's
motion to quash service of summons was granted.
49 270 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1959).
In Trippe an Illinois corporation
brought suit against a New Jersey corporation charging unfair competition
arising from the mailing of catalogues into the state. The court held that
the service of summons in New Jersey was invalid and, consequently jurisdiction over the defendant was lacking. The Court of Appeals ior the
Seventh Circuit followed Grobark v. Addo Mach. Co., 16 Ill. 2d 426, 158
N.E.2d 73 (1959), in holding that the defendant did not have the requisite
minimal contacts with Illinois nor did it commit any act, tortious or otherwise, in Illinois.
50 172 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
5l Id. at 631.
In Insull an Illinois resident obtained out-of-state
service under the Illinois "long-arm" statute on the non-resident defendants.
The corporate defendants were all incorporated elsewhere
than Illinois and their principal places of business were similarly situated
outside of Illinois. The sole contact of the defendants with the state of
Illinois was the distribution of a small number of their daily newspapers into
the state. The printing and first distribution of all the newspapers occurred
in other states. Upon these facts the court held that the defendants were
not transacting any business, nor did they commit any tortious acts, within
Illinois. Consequently, jurisdiction under the Illinois "long-arm" could not
attach.
52
Id. The district court's opinion was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit which held that the defendants' acts of mailing libelous matter into the state of Illinois did not constitute the necessary tortious
act committed within Illinois for submission jurisdiction under section
17(1) (b). Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corp., 273 F.2d 166 (7th
Cir. 1959). However, it should be noted that whether the act of publication
occurred in Illinois hinged upon the court's interpretation of the "single
publication rule;" see text at note 92 infra.
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munications-single. publication" rule.5 This rule necessitated
the finding that the defendants committed no tortious act within
the state of Illinois because the last .event necessary to render the
actor liable for the alleged defamation occurred elsewhere than
4
in Illinois.5
Two years after Insull was decided the Supreme Court of
Illinois applied the "last event",5 approach in Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.5G Two issues were decided
in Gray:57 (1) Whether a tortious act was committed within the

meaning of 17 (1) (b) ; and (2) whether a statutory construction
which answered the first issue affirmatively would be in derogation of due process as interpreted in InternationalShoe. In an-

swer to the first issue the court applied the "last event" theory.58
The court buttressed the use of the "last event-place of wrong"
approach by looking to the application of the rules of the statute

of limitations, reasoning that since the statute begins to run
from the time the injury is inflicted, the alleged tort must have

occurred in Illinois where the injury resulted because "the
53 Insull v. New York World-Telegram
Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615, 632
(N.D. Ill. 1959).
54As
Judge Miner stated in Insull:
Unless the... defendants, personally or through their agents, authored
the Illinois acts or omissions alleged to have damaged the plaintiff,
the terms of Section 17 (1) (b) have not been met. The alleged wrongful
Illinois acts were the respective Illinois distributions of ... newspapers.
Neither personally nor through agents did these defendants distribute
those newspapers within Illinois. It must, therefore, be concluded that
they committed no tortious act in Illinois within the meaning of
17(1) (b).
Id. at 631.
55 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §377 (1934): "The place of wrong
is in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an
alleged tort takes place."
5622 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
57id. at 435, 176 N.E.2d at 762-63.
The defendant in Gray
sought to avoid the result reached by the court by contending that
the statutory language "tortious" is different from the word "tort" "and
that . . . ['tortious act'] refers only to the act or conduct, separate and apart
from any consequences thereof." Id. at 436, 176 N.E.2d at 763. The court,
however, rejected the defendant's contention and held that "[t]o be tortious
an act must cause injury." Id. Whether or not an act must cause injury
to be considered "tortious" is a matter of philosophical interpretation. See,
e.g., Reese & Galston, Doing An Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of
Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. REV. 249 (1959). It is, therefore, not
surprising that there is widespread disagreement among various jurisdictions. For the application of "single act" statutes by the forum state
when the actual damage occurred in a sister state, see 14 DEPAUL L. REV. 202
(1964).
The Gray court found that the defendant had committed a tortious act
and thereby had satisfied the "minimum contacts" test even though" . . . the

defendant's only contact with . . . [Illinois] is found in the fact that a

product manufactured in Ohio was incorporated, in Pennsylvania, into a hot
water heater which in the course of commerce was sold to an Illinois consumer." Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d
432, 438, 176 N.E.2d 761, 764 (1961) (emphasis added).
58 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §377 (1934).
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alleged negligence . . . cannot be separated from the resulting
injury." 5
This conclusion presumes that the place of injury can be
definitely determined. Obviously, in Gray the presumption was
valid.60 However, tortious injury is not confined to such overt
physical occurrences. Defamation and invasion of privacy, for
example, result in injuries which cannot be as neatly ascribed
to either a particular place or an exact time.'' The mechanical
application of the "last event" theory to cases where the injury
is to an intangible quantum is likely to produce undesirable results. 2 - It is precisely because the "last event" theory is an
impractical and inflexible standard that severe scholarly criticism
has been levelled at it.63
Moreover, the Gray analysis should not be extended to cases
with complaints alleging amorphous injury, especially in view
of the fact that the second issue in Gray'' was decided by applying the very liberal approach of "minimum contacts." ' - It should
also be noted that the reasoning in Gray6 has been rejected and
criticized by courts in other jurisdictions. In Beaty v. M.S. Steel
Co. 6 7 Judge Harvey of the United States District Court for the
5 Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Il1. 2d
432, 435, 176 N.E.2d 761, 763 (1961).
60 The injuries suffered by the plaintiff in Gray resulted from the explosion of a water heater which contained a defectively manufactured
valve. Injuries of this nature are, for obvious reasons, susceptible to reasonably precise determination as to the time and place of occurrence.
61 See text at note 85 infra.
62 Such application not only produces confusion in the law, but also
predicates, the satisfaction of due process upon the fiction that the defendant's tortious conduct occurred within the state. See text at note 27
supra.
68 Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L. F. 533, 552-54.
68 See text at note 57 supra.
65 State interest, adequate notice to the defendant and convenience to
both parties are ostensibly the primary considerations for determining the
validity of the assertion of jurisdiction under the "long-arm." As the court

stated in Gray:

rT]he trend in defining due process of law is away from the emphasis
on territorial limitations and toward emphasis on providing adequate
notice and opportunity to be heard: from the court with immediate
power over the defendant, toward the court in which both parties can
most conveniently settle their dispute.
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 440,
176 N.E.2d 761, 765 (1961).
66 In determining whether due process requirements have been met where
jurisdiction is based on "minimum contacts," the Illinois Supreme Court
held that:
[Tlhe question cannot be answered by applying a mechanical formula
or rule of thumb but by ascertaining what is fair and reasonable in
the circumstances. In the application of this flexible test the relevant
inquiry is whether defendant engaged in some act or conduct by which
he may be said to have invoked the benefits and protections of the law
of the forum.
Id67276 F. Supp. 259 (D. Md. 1967). In Beaty an action was brought
against an Alabama corporation by two iron workers who were injured in
Maryland. The complaint alleged that the injury was caused by the col-
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District of Maryland, indicated that in his view Gray violated due
process requirements6s It is interesting to note that both Beaty
and Gray relied on the interpretation of due process as promulgated in International Shoe and arrived at incompatible conclusions. If Beaty were merely an isolated view, perhaps Gray would
have similarly found
be more acceptable; but other jurisdictions
69
Gray a just cause for criticism.
In Chunky Corporationv. Blumenthal Bros. Chocolate Co.,10
lapse of negligently manufactured bar joists which were produced by the

defendant in Alabama and were shipped into Maryland.

Jurisdiction over

the defendant was asserted under the Maryland "long-arm" statute which
was based substantially on article 1, section 1.03a of the UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT, 9B U.L.A. §1.03a. The relevant portion of the Maryland statute reads as follows:
§96(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who
acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the

person's...
(3) Causing tortious injury in this State by an act or omission in
this State;
(4) Causing tortious injury in this State by an act or omission
outside the State if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in
any other persistent course of conduct in this State or derives substantial revenue from food or services used or consumed in this State ....
MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, §96(a) (Cum. Supp. 1969). For a perceptive analysis of the Maryland "long-arm" statute, see Auerbach, The "Long Arm"
Comes to Maryland, 26 MD. L. REV. 13 (1966).
He said:
68 Beaty v. M.S. Steel Co., 276 F. Supp. 259 (D. Md. 1967).
[Allthough the precise question has not as yet been presented to the
state or Federal courts in Maryland, this Court concludes that the
Gray case would not be followed by the Maryland Court of Appeals. It
would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to
hold that a non-resident corporation could be sued in Maryland merely
because on one occasion its product manufactured in another state was
shipped into and used within this state.
Id. at 263.
6) In Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956),
a case which involved facts substantially similar to Beaty and Gray, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that the defendant's contacts
with the state of North Carolina were insufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process. The court held:
The orderly and fair administration of the laws throughout the nation
is a highly important factor to consider . . . . [Dlisorder and unfairness [are] likely to follow from sustaining jurisdiction in a case like
this . . . . To permit this could seriously impair the guarantees which
due process seeks to secure.
Id. at 507.
Plaintiff, a New York candy
70 299 F.
Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
manufacturer, sued a Pennsylvania chocolate company for damages resulting from an impure shipment of chocolate. The defendant brought a
third party complaint against a Wisconsin corporation doing business in
Illinois which supplied them with contaminated milk produced by a Pennsylvania dairy. The basis of the third party action was that if the defendant's
shipment of chocolate was impure it was solely because of contaminated
milk supplied to them by the third party defendants. On a motion to dismiss the third party action for lack of in personam jurisdiction under the
New York "long-arm" statute, the court held that:
If [the third party defendants) could be brought into this action, then
any supplier of raw material to a manufacturer which engages in interstate commerce could be compelled to defend an action in foreign jurisdictions with which the supplier has never had any contact. Such a
result does not follow from the holdings or reasoning of the Supreme
Court in Internat'l Shoe and Hanson, and would exceed the bounds of
"fair play and substantial justice."
Id. at 117.
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Judge Mansfield concluded that the standard of "minimum contacts," as handed down in InternationalShoe, and as interpreted
in Hanson v. Denckla, ' was not met by a corporation merely introducing goods into the flow of interstate commerce where such
corporation was not otherwise engaged in activities within the
forum state. In addition, the basis of the Gray decision, the
"last event" theory of the Restatement,72 has been abandoned by
the American Law Institute. : The reason given for this change
is that the "last event" approach did not always produce just
results because it was indiscriminately applied to all torts regardless of their nature. "No distinction was drawn between tortious
injuries to persons and to tangible things on the one hand and
to other kinds of tortious injuries on the other. '",
Furthermore, while the Gray approach may still be defended
on the basis that it is a feasible means of providing a state with
a method of protecting its legitimate interests insofar as the
majority of torts are concerned, the Gray rationale breaks down
completely in the area of multi-state defamation. One reason for
this lies in the fact that publication is the "last event" necessary
for liability in a defamation action. The importance of this concept of publication becomes readily apparent upon a brief examination of the theory behind publication and the single publication rule.
T

PUBLICATION AND THE SINGLE PUBLICATION RULE

The concept of defamation is rooted in the necessary element
of the communication of defamatory matter to a third person,'
who either reads or hears and understands that the words are
defamatory in nature. 6 The logical extension of this concept
was reached in Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer.- The sale of a
back copy of a libel-containing newspaper was held to be a new
71357 U.S. 235 (1958).
72 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §377 (1934).
73 RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

(Proposed

Official

Draft, Part II, 1968).

74d., Introductory Note §145.

7 Prosser, Interstate Publication,51 Mica. L. REv. 959 (1953)
Publication means communication to a third person; and until the words
have reached such a person there is no publication, and no tort. It is

not enough that slander is spoken to the plaintiff himself, or in a public

place; it must be overheard. It is not enough that a libel is written,
unless it is read. More than that, publication goes beyond communication of the words and includes comprehension of their meaning; and
if they reach only those who do not understand the language in which
they are spoken, or are too young to comprehend their significance, there
is stifl no tort. It follows logically that each communication to a different person may be a new and separate basis for a cause of action,
and that each repetition of the same words to the same person may
create a new liability.
Id. at 961.
76 W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 788 (3d ed. 1964).

77 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (Q.B. 1849).
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publication which gave rise to a cause of action despite the
fact that the initial publication had occurred nearly seventeen
years before.
Except for the expanded area of privilege,"8 the tort of libel
has changed little since the end of the seventeenth century. "
Methods of communication, publication and distribution have
changed considerably. Reproduction and dissemination of the
printed and spoken word is vastly different from past methods
of communication. Complex problems have arisen in defamation actions when courts have attempted to apply simple judicial
concepts to complex situations which were never anticipated. 0
One could reasonably contend, therefore, that the once simple
concept of publication can no longer be used as a determining
factor in asserting jurisdiction. The courts recognized this long
ago when they dealt with the problem of venue.
In 1908 the court in Julian v. Kansas City Star Co.8' made
the distinction between printing and publication and held that
regardless of the number of copies of the same issue which the
defendant distributes, they constitute but one publication. 2 This
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
79 The history of the law of defamation is beyond the scope of this
comment. Excellent discussions may be found in the following: Carr, The
English Law of Defamation, 18 L. Q. REV. 255, 388 (1902) ; Veeder, Historly
and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 546 (1903), 4
COLUM. L. REV. 33 (1904); Holdsworth, Defamation in the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Centuries, 40 L. Q. REV. 302, 397 (1924), 41 L. Q. REV. 13
(1925).
80 The Supreme Court of Illinois expressly recognized the problems
involved in applying judicial principles of yesterday to the society of today. In Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d
432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), the court stated:
Unless they are applied in recognition of the changes brought about
by technological and economic progress, jurisdictional concepts which
may have been reasonable enough in a simpler economy lose their relation to reality, and injustice rather than justice is promoted. Our unchanging principles of justice, whether procedural or substantive in
nature, should be scrupulously observed by the courts. But the rules
of law which grow and develop within those principles must do so in
the light of the facts of economic life as it is lived today. Otherwise
the need for adaptation may become so great that basic rights are
sacrificed in the name of reform, and the principles themselves become
impaired.
Id. at 443, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
81 209 Mo. 35, 107 S.W. 496 (1908). Accord, United States v. Smith,
173 F. 227 (D. Ind. 1909), where the court applied the rule that the publication of a defamatory article in a newspaper constitutes only one publication
and the place of publication was where the newspaper was published.
82 Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 107 S.W. 496 (1908):
[Olne issue of the newspaper, though it may have been of many thousand copies distributed in many different counties, gave but one cause
of action, but to reach that conclusion we must say that there was but
one publication. If we should say that the publication in Jackson
county was a publication distinct from that in Platte county, then we
would have to say that there were more than one publication and more
than one cause of action. But there was but one publication - one
utterance - and though some of the papers did not reach their destination as soon as others, yet they all emanated from the one act and all
78
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concept of publication has been referred to as the single publication rule. In its original form the single publication rule limited
the plaintiff to one cause of action per jurisdiction. A new cause
of action was said to exist in every state in which the libel was
circulated.13 This pragmatic approach, however, was not accepted by all jurisdictions. Thirty years after Julian there were
still judges who clung to the security of the orthodox rule of Duke
4
of Brunswick.1
Whether a redistribution of an original publication was any
different for the purposes of the statute of limitations from a
reprinting was also a point of disagreement5 Adding to the
confusion was the problem which arose because of the use of
constituted but one libel, if libel at all. It is the publication of the libel,
not the printing of it, that gives the right of action.
Id. at 71-72, 107 S.W. at 500.
83 O'Reilly v. Curtis Publishing Co., 31 F. Supp. 364 (D. Mass. 1940).
84 In Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, 254 App. Div. 211, 4 N.Y.S.2d
640 (1938), Judge Taylor stated in his dissent:
The custom of publishers of newspapers is wholly immaterial to the
question of publication, and permission to read its files which contained
the libels was an affirmative act by which the defamatory matter was
communicated to the reader. That defendant, the composer of the
defamatory matter, did not intend or expect that it would be read on
the particular occasion is also immaterial in the question of publication.
The law is well settled:
That a libel is published when it is read by anyone but the one
defamed;
That unless occasioned by the wrongful act of a third person, an
accidentaf or inadvertent communication is a publication of the libel if
the communication resulted from any act or default on the part of the
writer; and
That each publication of the libel is a wrong which gives rise to a
separate cause of action.
Id. at 214, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
85 In Winrod v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Ill.
1945), the court noted that:
Several courts, especially the New York State courts and the Federal
District courts in the New York City District, have held that the later
mailing out of copies of a magazine to replace copies lost or damaged
in distribution or in response to requests for the purchase of single
copies does not constitute a republication.
The decisions in .

.

. cases [like Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers,

Inc., 254 App. Div. 211, 4 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1938)] are based upon two
premises, first, that the mailing out of single copies of the magazine

after the original distribution is a part of the original publication, and
second, that to hold otherwise would nullify the statute of limitations.
But this court does not agree with the reasoning of those cases.
[Tihis court cannot, on principle, distinguish between the act of a publisher in mailing out a copy of the original issue from the act of a publisher in sending out a magazine which is identical in composition but
which has merely been run through the printing presses a second time.
Assuredly, the mere act of reprinting and mailing the same magazine
out to the public upon request has the same effect as if one of the unsold copies of the original issue were mailed out.
Id. at 251-52. The New York court in Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc.,
254 App. Div. 211, 4 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1938), was faced with nearly the same
problem as the court in Duke of Brunswick, suprm note 77. The Wolfson
court rejected the strict English interpretation of publication because in their
view "such a rule would nullify the clear purpose of the Statute of Limitations." Id. at 213, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
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the single publication rule in determining which was the final
event of publication.6

The placing of the libelous material with

a common carrier, 7 the moment the edition first went on public
sale, "- "when the issue goes into circulation generally,"8 9 were
all held to be the moment

-

the single point in time

-

when

publication occurred so as to toll the statute of limitations. The
single publication rule obviously does not enjoy uniform interpretation throughout the country.90 The Illinois view of the single
publication rule, as explained by Judge Miner in Insull v. New
York World-Telegram Corp., 91 is the "multiple communicationssingle publication" theory92 The effect of this rule is to give
a plaintiff a single cause of action for a widespread distribution
of a single allegedly defamatory writing and to toll the statute
of limitations upon the first publication of such a writing.
Shortly after Insull was decided Illinois adopted the Uniform
Single Publication Act 9 3 which codified the existing rule.9 4 However, the adoption of this act by Illinois did not eliminate the

complex" conflict of laws problems which exist in the area of
multi-state defamation.6
8 Note, The Single Publication Rule in Libel: A Fiction Misapplied,
62 HARv. L. REv. 1041 (1949).
87 Backus v. Look, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
8 Means v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y.
1939).
89 Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 671, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
90 While jurisdictions might be in agreement where the statute of
limitations is at issue, they might very well be in disagreement where venue
is at issue. Compare Hartmann v. American News Co., 69 F. Supp. 736
(W.D. Wis. 1947) with Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir.
1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 838 (1948).
91172 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
92

Id. at 632.

ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 126, §§11-12 (1967):
No person shall have more than one cause of action for damages
for libel or slander or invasion of privacy or any other tort founded
upon any single publication or exhibition or utterance, such as any one
edition of a newspaper or book or magazine or any one presentation to
an audience or any one broadcast over radio or television or any one
exhibition of a motion picture. Recovery in any action shall include all
damages for any such tort suffered by the plaintiff in all jurisdictions.
A judgment in any jurisdiction for or against the plaintiff upon
the substantive merits of any action for damages founded upon a single
publication or exhibition or utterance . . . shall bar any other action
for damages by the same plaintiff against the same defendant founded
upon the same publication or exhibition or utterance.
94 Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1962).
95 Professor Prosser suggests the complexity of the problem:
The realm of the conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled with quaking
quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who
theorize about mysterious matters in a strange and incomprehensible
jargon. The ordinary court, or lawyer, is quite lost when engulfed and
entangled in it.
In connection with inter-state publication, it offers
peculiar and baffling difficulties.
Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REv. 959, 971 (1953).
96 The discussion of the conflict of laws and choice-of-laws problems
here is only for the purpose of summarily presenting some of the difficulties
and intricacies, and, to indicate how they affect the jurisdictional aspects
with which this Comment is primarily concerned. The magnitude of the
98
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CONFLICT OF LAWS

The conflict of laws"7 problem in multi-state defamation has
spawned numerous theories as to what law should govern in a
given case. A few of the more prominent theories which have
been suggested are: (1) the law of the place of first publication
where the "seal of privacy was first broken;"" (2) the law of
each place of publication; 9' (3) the law of the place where the
greatest harm occurs ;100 (4) the law of the state where the publisher is incorporated;'(" (5) the law of the state where the
publisher has his principal place of business ;102 (6) the law of
the state where the plaintiff is domiciled;103 (7) the law of the
state where the plaintiff has his principal place of business ;104 (8)
the law of the state of defendant's act; 0 5 and, (9) the law of the
forum.10 6 The fact that other rules have also been advocated further emphasizes the disagreement and confusion which exist in
this area. Not surprisingly it has been suggested that federal
legislation be enacted in order to achieve some degree of uniformity.17 There is a great deal of merit in this suggestion if
for no other reason than to establish certainty and uniformity
in an area where confusion and disharmony reign. But there
are other more compelling reasons for exploring the possibilities
and practicalities of a unifying federal procedural law for multistate defamation actions.
complexities alluded to can be more fully appreciated by an examination of

some of these sources: Note, The Choice of Law in Multistate Defamation
- A Functional Approach, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1463 (1964); Note, An Examination of Publication and Choice of Law Problems in Multi-State Libel, 56
Nw. U.L. REV. 823 (1962); Prosser, Interstate Publication. 51 MicH. L.
REV. 959 (1953) ; Note, Conflict of Laws Problems in Multi-State Libel, 16
U. CHI. L. REv. 164 (1949) ; Note, The Single Publication Doctrine and Conflicts of Law Problems in Multi-State Libel, 43 ILL. L. REv. 556 (1948);
Note, Characterizationof Multi-State Libel in Conflict of Laws, 48 COLUM.
L. REV. 932 (1948) ; Note, The Choice of Law in Multistate Defamation and
Invasion of Privacy: An Unsolved Problem, 60 HARV. L. REv. 941 (1947);
W. COOK, LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE

CONFLICT OF LAWS

(1942).

97 See Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflicts-of-Laws
Methods, 25 U. CH. L. REV. 227, 251-54 (1958).
98 Banks v. King Features, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
99 See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, Explanatory Notes §377, rule
5 at 457 (1934). "Where harm is done to the reputation of a person, the
place of wrong is where the defamatory statement is communicated." Id.
100 Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1949).
101 Note, Multi-State Libel and Conflict of Laws, 35 VA. L. REV. 627
(1949).
102 United States v. Smith, 173 F. 227 (D. Ind. 1909).
103 Estill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 186 F.2d 1017 (7th Cir. 1951).
104 Leflar, The Single Publication Rule, 25 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 263, 270
(1953) ;10 LA. L.REV. 339, 345 (1950).
105 Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 Mo-i. L. REv. 959, 974-75 (1953)
Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multi-State Torts: Law and
Reason Versus the Restatement, 36 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1951).
106 Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1947).
107 Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REv. 959, 995-99 (1953)
Note, The Choice of Law in Multi-State Defamation and Invasion of Privacy: An Unsolved Problem, 60 HARV. L. REV. 941, 951 (1947).
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The possibility that the constitutional right of free speech
will be impaired by the uncertainty of the present state laws
has long been recognized as a real.and serious threat to a fundamental right in a free society.1 0
These first amendment considerations have been frequently raised by the non-resident defendant contesting "long-arm" jurisdiction.1 9 In Novel v. Garrison'11 an Ohio resident sued a Louisiana domiciliary and a Delaware corporation which had its principal place of business in Illin-ois for an alleged libel which appeared in Playboy magazine.'
This diversity action was brought in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois.112 In an opinion by
Chief Judge Campbell the court denied defendant Garrison's
motions to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction and on
the basis of improper venue. Buckley v. New York Post Corp."'
was considered "exceptionally persuasive"' by the court to support its conclusion that the single publication rule of Insull v.
New York World-Telegram Corp.115 would not govern the facts

of Novel. The court indicated that it was employing the former
single publication approach of New York'", and the Second Circuiti" even though the latter has more recently applied the Insull
approach." 8
108

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 322-25 (1945)

(dissent); Note, Long Arm Jurisdiction Over Publishers: To Chill A Mocking Word, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 342 (1967); Note, Can The "Long-Arm"

Reach Out-of-State Publishers?, 43 N.D. LAWYER 83, 93-97 (1967); Note,
Qonstitutional Limitations to Long Arm Jurisdiction in Newspaper Libel
Cases, 34 U. Cin. L. REV. 436 (1967).
109 New York Times v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966); Walker v.
Savell, 335 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1964). Cf. Novel v. Garrison, 294 F. Supp.
825
(N.D. 11. 1969); Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d
Cir. 1967).

110 294 F. Supp. 825 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
ill PLAYBOY, Oct., 1969, at 59.
1" The absence of many reported cases in the Illinois courts indicates
that multi-state defamation cases are frequently heard in the federal courts.
Thus, the Illinois law in this area has been developed almost exclusively by
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See, e.g., Novel
v. Garrison, 294 F. Supp. 825 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Wheeler v. Dell Publishing
Co., 300 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1962); Insull v. New York World-Telegram
Oorp., 172 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. Ill. 1959), aff'd mem., 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir.
1959).
11 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967).

'4"Novel

v. Garrison, 294 F. Supp. 825, 830-31 (N.D. I1. 1969).

115 See text at note 90 supra.

Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 81 N.E.2d 45 (1948).
Backus v. Look, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
118 Zuck v. Interstate Publishing Co., 317 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1963).
Compare Zuck with Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d
Cir. 1967). The court was interpreting New York law in the former and
Connecticut law in the latter. The Novel court noted this distinction and
said:
Assuming that the intent of the Insull holding was to limit the
cause of action to the state of first sale, the decision has been severely
criticized and recently expressly rejected by the Court of Appeals for
116
117
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The crux of the problem involved the reconciliation of the
"single publication" rule of Insull with the expansive "minimum
contacts" concept of Gray. The Buckley court acknowledged that
such reconciliation is dubious indeed."' In Novel the court ostensibly rejected the "single publication" of Insull while at the
same time accepted the "most substantial relationship" test of
Insull. 20 The explanation for this lies in the fact that faced with
the two irreconcilable rules the court ultimately relied upon the
doctrine of forum non conveniens." The "vortex' ' 2 2 of activity
occurred in Illinois and, notwithstanding the rules which would
dictate a different result, other factors having been considered,
the most logical place for trial was held to be Illinois."'3 Consequently, the court concluded that publication occurred in Illinois
the Second Circuit.

I find the reasoning of that court exceptionally

persuasive ....

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Buckley, appears to
accept Gray and reject Insull, indicating that it must view the decisions
in those cases as contradictory in policy if not literally.
Novel v. Garrison, 294 F. Supp. 825, 830,31 (N.D. Il. 1969).
119 Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 180 (2d Cir. 1967).
The American Law Institute reached the same conclusion as indicated by
the abandonment of the "last event" approach (upon which Gray was predicated) in cases of defamation, fraud, invasion of privacy, unfair competition and interference with a marital relationship. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introductory Note §145 (Proposed Official Draft, Part
II, 1968). The Restatement now proposes that the "vested rights" doctrine
of the old Restatement be replaced and that the " . . . law of the state which
.. .has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties"
should govern as to a particular issue or case. Id. The factors to be considered in ascertaining the state with the most "significant relationship" are
determined by the nature of the tort involved. An examination of these
factors reveals that they are the same factors the courts have been struggling with for years; e.g., Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corp., 172
F. Supp. 615, 633 (N.D. I1. 1959), aff'd mem., 273 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1959)
("state which bears the most substantial relationship to all communications
to third parties in all states in which communication occurs"); Palmisano
v. News Syndicate Co., 130 F. Supp. 17, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (state of principal reputation) ; Dale System v. General Teleradio, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 745,
749 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) ("grouping of dominant contacts"). See also Note,
The Choice of Law in Multistate Defamation - A Functional Approach, 77
HARv. L. REv. 1463 (1964).
120 Novel v. Garrison, 294 F. Supp. 825, 832 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
1'gSuch ultimate reliance upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens
was predicted years ago by Professor Ehrenzweig:
It may well be that in the law of jurisdiction over individuals ...
a
substantial "minimum contact" will ultimately be the touchstone of
permissible jurisdiction. The question will then arise whether this
formula, whose extreme flexibility is hardly preferable to the extreme
rigidity of the classical rule of physical personal service, will not need
to be supplemented by criteria developed within the civilian laws of
competency, or, more likely, within the common law of forum non
conveniens.
Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power"
Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L. J. 289, 311-12 (1956).
122 Novel v. Garrison, 294 F. Supp. 825, 833 (N.D. Il1. 1969).
123Id. See generally Foster, Judicial Economy; Fairness and Convenience of Place of Trial: Long-Arm Jurisdiction in District Courts, 47
F.R.D. 73 (1969) ; Forde, The Emergence of Metropolitan Centers as Litigation Centers for the "Big Case": New Concepts in Federal and State Court
Jurisdiction,2 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 1 (1968).
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and the defendant .was, therefore, subject to the court's jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION

Although both are standards for measuring the defendant's
contact with the state, the "most substantial relationship" test
differs from the "vortex" of activity test; the former is a qualitative test while the latter is quantitative. The minimum contacts
required for submission jurisdiction under the Illinois "long-arm"
concerns the quality and nature of the defendant's act; not the
geographic center of all acts giving rise to operative facts.
The minimum contacts alone should have been sufficient to decide
the jurisdictional question in Novel. The court, however, was
fettered with the basically incompatible theories of Gray and
Insull. But by introducing the "vortex" concept as a basis for
the decision a new and unnecessary factor has been added to an
already confused area of the law. The applicability of the
"long-arm" based upon a single tortious act in multi-state defamation actions is indeed questionable. New York specifically
excludes such actions under the similar provision of their "longSubmission jurisdiction under the Illinois "long-arm" has
been effective in reaching the non-resident defendant acting outside, but causing injury within, Illinois. The interest and dignity
of the state has been upheld and the plaintiff, injured in Illinois,
has been provided with a convenient forum. However, the effectiveness of the "long-arm" does have its limitations. A failure to
recognize those limits will inevitably result in a strained interpretation of the meaning of "the commission of a tortious act within
this state." Uniform legislation designed to provide a more practical jurisdictional foundation is an attractive alternative that
could greatly simplify the current law.
Alan R. Taradash

124

N.Y. Civ. PRAc. §302(a) (McKinney Supp. 1967).

